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During the first week of December, President Trump convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions highlights the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—though how this squares with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson echoed this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This change is consequential, but observers note it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable feud has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Action

A similar standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.